Stake DAO’s governance framework is articulated around this governance framework where debates take place (any debate held on other platforms are not taken into account), and the Stake DAO’s voting infrastructure accessible at Stake DAO | Governance and powered by Snapshot.
Governance Principles
The governance framework is guided by the following principles:
- decentralisation and open participation;
- transparency and verifiability;
- security and risk minimisation;
- proportionality of decision-making processes;
- and alignment with applicable legal frameworks.
On this forum can be posted ideas, discussions, reports, etc. in the General category.
This forum is also where governance proposals can be posted and debated under the following categories.
Proposal categories
This framework replaces the unified SDGP category from SDGP-26 with four proposal classes:
Category A — Stake DAO Governance Proposals (SDGP)
Scope: General governance decisions, including but not limited to: grant requests, fee adjustments, strategic partnerships, integration requests, protocol parameter changes, infrastructure upgrades, contributor rewards, etc.
| Parameter | Value |
|---|---|
| Forum debate period | 3 days minimum |
| Voting period | 7 days |
| Debate and vote | Sequential (debate first, then vote) |
| Quorum | 15% of total vlSDT supply |
| Approval threshold | Simple majority (>50% of votes cast, excl. abstentions) |
| Anticipated execution | If super-quorum is reached |
Process:
- Proposal posted on the governance forum with a minimum 3-day debate period.
- After the debate period, the proposal is posted on Snapshot for a 7-day vote.
- If quorum is reached and the proposal achieves a simple majority, the DAO Multisig may execute the approved action.
Category B — Emergency Proposals
Scope: Exclusively reserved for situations requiring immediate governance action. Examples include: responding to a security incident, authorizing emergency treasury disbursements to reimburse affected users (cf. SDGP-65), activating emergency protocol parameters, etc.
| Parameter | Value |
|---|---|
| Forum debate period | 24 hours |
| Voting period | 24 hours |
| Debate and vote | Concurrent (debate and vote run in parallel) |
| Quorum | 30% of total vlSDT supply |
| Approval threshold | Simple majority (>50% of votes cast, excl. abstentions) |
| Anticipated execution | If super-quorum is reached |
Process:
- Proposal posted simultaneously on the governance forum and Snapshot.
- The forum post must include a clear justification of the emergency nature of the proposal.
- Debate and voting run concurrently for 24 hours.
- The higher quorum requirement (30%) aims to ensure that emergency decisions carry broad community legitimacy despite the compressed timeline.
- If quorum is reached and the proposal achieves a simple majority, the DAO Multisig may proceed with execution without delay, subject to applicable security, technical, and legal validation.
Abuse prevention: Any proposer invoking the Emergency category for a matter that does not constitute a legitimate emergency may see the proposal vetoed by the Association (see Section 4 below). Community members are encouraged to flag inappropriate use of the Emergency category on the governance forum.
Category C — Minor Impact Proposals
Scope: Low-impact, routine, or housekeeping decisions that do not materially affect the protocol’s security, contract architecture, or strategic direction. Examples include: small bug bounty payments (e.g. $1,000), minor operational expenditures, cosmetic parameter updates, non-controversial administrative actions, answering to a short term RFP, etc.
| Parameter | Value |
|---|---|
| Forum debate period | 24 hours |
| Voting period | 24 hours |
| Debate and vote | Concurrent (debate and vote run in parallel) |
| Quorum | 30% of total vlSDT supply |
| Approval threshold | Simple majority (>50% of votes cast, excl. abstentions) |
| Anticipated execution | If super-quorum is reached |
Process:
- Proposal posted simultaneously on the governance forum and Snapshot.
- The forum post must clearly indicate why the proposal qualifies as minor impact.
- Debate and voting run concurrently for 24 hours.
- The elevated quorum (30%) compensates for the shortened timeline, ensuring that even fast-tracked minor decisions have sufficient community awareness.
- If quorum is reached and the proposal achieves a simple majority, the DAO Multisig may execute.
Scope limitation: If a community member challenges the classification of a proposal as “minor impact” during the debate period, and the challenge is supported by substantive arguments, the proposer should consider withdrawing and resubmitting under Category A (SDGP).
Materiality Threshold:
A proposal shall not qualify as “Minor Impact” if it:
-
Affects smart contract logic;
-
Impacts user funds or risk parameters;
-
Introduces new integrations or counterparties;
-
Exceeds a threshold of $20,000.
In case of doubt, the proposal must default to Category A.
Category D — Lending Market Adjustment Proposals
Scope: Technical parameter adjustments for Stake DAO’s curated Morpho lending vaults. This includes, but is not limited to: adding or removing a lending market from a vault, adjusting supply caps, modifying collateral parameters, adjusting fees, changing roles, or any other vault parameter change.
| Parameter | Value |
|---|---|
| Forum debate period | 3 days |
| Voting period | 3 days |
| Debate and vote | Concurrent (debate and vote run in parallel) |
| Quorum | 15% of total vlSDT supply |
| Approval threshold | Simple majority (>50% of votes cast, excl. abstentions) |
| Anticipated execution | If super-quorum is reached |
Process:
- Proposal posted simultaneously on the governance forum and Snapshot.
- Debate and voting run concurrently for 3 days.
- The on-chain transaction implementing the parameter update may be submitted to the timelock during the voting period, provided that the timelock duration is at least 3 days. This means the transaction cannot be finalized before the vote concludes.
- If the vote passes (quorum met + simple majority), the timelocked transaction is allowed to execute upon timelock expiry.
- If the vote fails, the timelocked transaction must be cancelled before execution.
Rationale for concurrent execution and timelock: Lending market parameters may require timely adjustments to respond to market conditions. The 3-day duration aligns with the minimum timelock requirements of Morpho, and allows for decentralisation of the Morpho vaults while limiting the impact on the management agility of the vaults.
Lending Risk Acknowledgement:
Lending market parameter adjustments may materially impact risk exposure, liquidation thresholds, and user positions.
Participants acknowledge that such decisions involve financial risk and are made on a best-effort basis without guarantees of performance or safety.
Notice: Non-Binding Nature of Off-Chain Voting
Snapshot voting is an off-chain signalling mechanism and does not, in itself, trigger any automatic on-chain execution.
All approved proposals are subject to independent verification and discretionary execution by the DAO Multisig and/or relevant smart contract mechanisms.
Execution may be withheld where required for security, technical validation, or legal compliance.
Super-Quorum: Immediate Execution Mechanism
For all proposal categories (A, B, C, and D):
If 50% or more of the total vlSDT supply votes in favour of a proposal, the proposal becomes eligible for immediate execution, subject to the conditions below.
This super-quorum mechanism provides a path for rapid execution when an overwhelming majority of the community has already expressed its will. It applies uniformly across all categories.
Implementation details:
- The super-quorum is calculated as 50% of the total vlSDT supply (not 50% of votes cast), meaning it requires an absolute majority of all existing voting rights.
- Abstentions and “Against” votes do not count toward the super-quorum threshold.
- Once the super-quorum is reached, the DAO Multisig is authorized to execute the proposal without waiting for the remaining voting or debate period to expire.
- The DAO Multisig may proceed with execution, subject to:
- (i) technical validation,
- (ii) security review, where applicable, and
- (iii) confirmation that execution does not expose the protocol or its operators to material risk.
- The Snapshot vote remains open for the full duration for record-keeping purposes, but execution may proceed immediately.
Association Veto Right
The Stake DAO Association (Zug, Switzerland) is granted a protective veto right under the following conditions:
Nature of the Veto Right: The veto right is a protective safeguard exercised in good faith for risk mitigation purposes and does not constitute discretionary control over protocol governance.
Liability Limitation: The exercise or non-exercise of the veto right shall not give rise to any liability of the Stake DAO Association or its members toward token holders or third parties.
Scope of the veto: The Association may decline to execute (or instruct the DAO Multisig not to execute) a proposal that has been approved by governance if, and only if, the Association determines in good faith that:
- The proposal is the result of a governance attack (e.g., flash loan-based voting manipulation, vote buying, or coordinated manipulation by a malicious actor);
- The proposal would cause material and irreversible harm to the protocol, its users, or its treasury;
- The proposal violates applicable law or would expose the Association or its members to legal liability.
- The Association has clearly stated in the forum, before the end of the debate period, that the category used was not the correct one and that the proposal should be republished as a standard SDGP.
Procedural requirements:
- The Association must publish a written justification for any veto within 48 hours of exercising it.
- The justification must be posted on the governance forum and clearly state the grounds for the veto.
- The veto is subject to community override: following a veto, the community may resubmit the proposal under Category A (SDGP) with standard timelines.
If the resubmitted proposal is approved with a quorum of at least 20% of the total vlSDT supply, the Stake DAO Association shall use reasonable efforts to implement the outcome, unless doing so would:
(i) violate applicable law;
(ii) expose the Association or its members to legal or regulatory liability; or
(iii) pose a material risk to the security or integrity of the protocol.
Limitations:
- The veto right is a protective mechanism and shall not be used to override legitimate governance decisions based on policy disagreement.
- The Association shall maintain a public log of all vetoes exercised, including the date, proposal reference, and grounds.
Delegation of voting power
Once vlSDT is live, users will be able (but not obligated) to delegate their vlSDT voting rights to a delegate of their choice. This will be done thanks to the standard delegation strategy of Snapshot. vlSDT holders who have delegated their voting rights will always be able to override their delegate’s vote on a proposal by voting themselves.
This will increase the participation in proposals, especially in a context where, with the new governance framework, the number of proposals is expected to increase. It will also help reaching super-quorum which is nearly impossible otherwise.
Delegation Disclaimer:
Delegation does not transfer ownership of vlSDT and does not create any fiduciary duty between the delegator and the delegate.
Delegates act independently and are not agents, representatives, or fiduciaries of the Stake DAO Association.
Summary Table
| Parameter | Cat. A (SDGP) | Cat. B (Emergency) | Cat. C (Minor) | Cat. D (Lending) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Forum debate | 3 days (before vote) | 24h (concurrent) | 24h (concurrent) | 3 days (concurrent) |
| Voting period | 7 days | 24h | 24h | 3 days |
| Quorum | 15% | 30% | 30% | 15% |
| Approval | Simple majority | Simple majority | Simple majority | Simple majority |
| Super-quorum | 50% total supply | 50% total supply | 50% total supply | 50% total supply |
| Timelock pre-submit | No | No | No | Yes (≥3 days) |