How can StakeDAO help the USDM Mochi community?

We’re asking Curve, Convex, StakeDAO, and Yearn Teams to help with a slow rug problem.

As you may know, Curve has only called one Emergency DAO action which caused losses for whales who provided 3CRV liquidity to the USDM pool, as well as significant losses to holders who did not know about this emergency action and became USDM bag holders. The Curve team told Azeem that he needed to do at least two things: create a multisig wallet and form a DAO. From our research, the multisig is faked with his own accounts. The DAO is not formed, there’s no webpage to make proposals to help steer the direction of USDM and Mochi. In fact, Azeem has a habit of blocking people from commenting in the GAIADAO Discord and deleting their comments. This is the opposite of decentralized, community led solutions that Curve advised.

Moreover, let’s add a couple more things to the mix.

Azeem has implemented a 25% management & performance fee which he collects from the 1.1 million Convex tokens that have been locked. Why? In what world does he deserve 25%? Isn’t he also a bag holder, and could earn rewards based on the size of his USDM bag?

These CVX tokens were previously locked in Convex and delegated to Votium / Union, but now are delegated to StakeDAO. He once raised this performance fee to 55% until he was called out and the amount was reduced back down to 25%.

Azeem has threatened that 100% of the rewards of locked Convex tokens will be sold to purchase USDM. I advised him that he could demonstrate pro-social behavior by using his 25% performance / management fee to buy USDM on his own and continue with 75% of the rewards going to USDM stakeholders.

Now it has happened. Azeem has begun his own personal strategy. I’ll detail below with help from Yangu who did this research. We’d like feedback from the four protocol teams about what can be done.

Yangu generated this table: sep_24-25_az_scam_fee.csv

Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 E F G H I J
Tx hash & date gCRV minted to Safe (big + small) Small gCRV mint → Safe gCRV returned by claimer Total gCRV available (minted + returned) gCRV sent to claimer gCRV sent to operator (0xfc6c40…) Residual gCRV left in Safe Total withheld (operator + small mint + returned + residual) Withheld % of total
0x567e27b7… (Aug‑14‑2025) 0 0 0 (no gCRV minted) 0 1 011.5584 gCRV sent to operator Not a claim; just a redemption swap. N/A
0xea80d857… (Aug‑08‑2025) 0 0 0 (no gCRV minted) 0 829.4647 gCRV sent to operator Not a claim; redemption with FXS swap. N/A
0xaca7bf80… (Jul‑23‑2025) 45 807.94 261.43 956.34 47 025.71 gCRV 36 642.61 gCRV sent to claimer 10 376.33 gCRV 6.77 gCRV 11600.87 24.67%
0x235bc3b3… (Jun‑25‑2025) 45 994.10 238.46 907.17 47 139.72 gCRV 36 779.84 gCRV to claimer 10 340.19 gCRV 19.70 gCRV 11505.51 24.41%
0xf548bc9d… (Jun‑11‑2025) 47 592.23 282.64 831.53 48 706.40 gCRV 38 068.87 gCRV to claimer 10 629.67 gCRV 7.86 gCRV 11751.7 24.13%
0x1718e556… (May‑28‑2025) 43 708.47 404.06 808.4 44 920.94 gCRV 34 954.47 gCRV to claimer 9 950.61 gCRV 15.86 gCRV 11178.93 24.89%
0x4fd40373… (Jul‑09‑2025) 53 403.54 287.49 875.73 54 566.76 gCRV 42 664.50 gCRV to claimer 11 828.87 gCRV 73.39 gCRV 13065.48 23.94%
0xf2df6f2e… (May‑2025) 34 418.73 415.45 642.92 35 477.10 gCRV 27 506.43 gCRV to claimer 7 932.34 gCRV 38.33 gCRV 9029.04 25.45%
0xfd32f170… (14‑May‑2025) 42 111.21196654214989314 454.9956103 899.2149169 43 465.42 33 687.551183759579706968 9 773.749911814008187565 4.121398186 11 132.0818 25.61%
0x614ed0d4… (30‑Apr‑2025) 47 570.875471207207923089 413.1274027 802.4065748 48 786.41 38 030.550032434582128213 10 722.470390091980897420 33.38902609 11 971.39 24.54%
0x58447dd2… (16‑Apr‑2025) 42 189.371334810079135598 427.2785113 867.5817941 43 484.23 33 700.224126022232246325 9 719.207866479046836202 64.79964773 11 078.8678 25.48%
0x6e2c8857… (??‑2025) 42 410.774414449917288465 327.761187 666.9898081 43 405.53 33 903.783204228171644363 9 468.691339792302984857 33.05086552 10 496.4932 24.18%
0xe3063a95… (??‑2025) 35 343.296017588844859136 310.7846046 647.5040204 36 301.58 28 264.182400639082172324 8 022.550721649484105954 14.85152032 8 995.6909 24.78%
0x97b9bd0f… (??‑2025) 36 890.470404042721438009 346.572379 678.0846873 37 915.13 29 476.893568687451946185 8 393.302572816904710898 44.93132884 9 462.8910 24.96%
0x4b2f285c… (19‑Feb‑2025) 35 302.131538541620539610 288.3577982 850.803828 36 441.29 28 221.406329270297748211 8 192.510397979791505914 27.37643754 9 359.0485 25.68%
0x0ed7c469… (Dec‑10‑2024) 45 020.591631410438078425 gCRV 241.229517575500643813 gCRV 668.2557081017895946 gCRV 45 930.0768570877 35 990.28790559192835372 gCRV 9 906.663151290662846919 gCRV 33.125800205137116199 gCRV 10 849.27417717309 gCRV 23.62%
0x1078656c… (Jan‑22‑2025) 35 232.298125461949641378 gCRV 250.543816109760678687 gCRV 646.932796379129143172 gCRV 36 129.7747379508 28 154.009884264068788622 gCRV 7 933.988160471292147391 gCRV 41.776693215478527224 gCRV 8 873.24146617566 gCRV 24.56%
0xda6a7297… (Feb‑2025) 34 511.967571610342395709 gCRV 443.091230908513138718 gCRV 615.210100804645964902 gCRV 35 570.2689033235 27 593.499898616364967804 gCRV 7 955.30360972197549863 gCRV 21.465394985161032895 gCRV 9 035.07033642030 gCRV 25.40%
0xefe2458c… (Dec‑25‑2024) 32 735.704353412513955254 gCRV 426.9603965243397999064 gCRV 736.009534388948829578 gCRV 33 898.67428432580 26 173.884992738489720657 gCRV 7 705.611845896201275036 gCRV 19.177445691111589045 gCRV (leftover, computed) 8 887.7592225006 gCRV 26.22%
0x326c0a71… (Dec‑10‑2024) 31 692.15793765376322185 gCRV 322.51386798506768177 gCRV 417.822124602141027416 gCRV 32 432.49393024097 25 342.683285615239833188 gCRV No direct gCRV to operator (all gCRV stayed in Safe) 7 089.810644625733 gCRV (large residual) 7 830.14663721294 gCRV 24.14%
0xb0632a3d… (Nov‑2024) 29 734.809902406241716565 gCRV 614.010273842449880835 gCRV 1 200.041574720375621852 gCRV 31 548.86175096907 23 783.797526726430699617 gCRV 7 759.07905981606775739 gCRV 5.985164426568762245 gCRV 9 579.11607280547 gCRV 30.36%
0x1eb44f82… (Nov‑2024) 39 386.50631815370158992 gCRV 252.956030414524374837 gCRV 446.223156081884935393 gCRV 40 085.6855046501 31 504.019718249174789611 gCRV 8 561.328407546135582067 gCRV 20.337378854800528472 gCRV 9 280.84497289735 gCRV 23.15%
0x4e29fe7b… (Nov‑2024) 34 958.769083526833293876 gCRV 364.460159397849446363 gCRV 688.655646176822797003 gCRV 36 011.884889101505 27 947.915397701104345305 gCRV 8 036.443558159210298578 gCRV 27.525933241190893359 gCRV 9 117.085296975074 gCRV 25.32%
0x219989bc… (Oct‑2024) 44 771.084358852505446152 gCRV 786.707414494287589624 gCRV 1 733.777922887305373039 gCRV 47 291.569696234095 35 789.811315798649807444 gCRV 11 467.095743723688427716 gCRV 34.662636711760173655 gCRV 14 022.243717817042 gCRV 29.65%
0xfead9e7b… (Sep‑2024) 88 130.872858940609251656 gCRV 709.311324087051270871 gCRV 782.901863078607695865 gCRV 89 623.08604610625 70 440.205829304022025299 gCRV 19 101.737697635892137188 gCRV 81.142519166354055905 gCRV 20 675.09340396791 gCRV 23.07%
0xf2df6f2e… (Sep‑2024) 34 418.731173133485577026 gCRV 415.445659359707940801 gCRV 642.923817288195049519 gCRV 35 477.100649781388567 27 506.431838379316677104 gCRV 7 932.347041?* gCRV (operator) 38.33 gCRV (approx residual) 9 029.04 gCRV ≈25.45 %

Shows distributions in the last year and approximately how much was withheld (~25% scam fee) Interestingly, I couldn’t see a fee taken for the last resync, since transition from the Union/Votium to StakeDao. Perhaps he hasn’t set up his contract for it yet.

The majority of the fee is converted to DAI, which is then offramped to exchanges, eg.

Recent update:
Looks like StakeDao splits up the biweekly distribution into 2 claims, the first claim AZ did indeed send to PBM (as I posted above), the other half (sent 2 days ago) he sent $16k to his personal wallet to buy more USDM and deposit in PBM again-this time ~300k USDM. (Sorry can’t post screenshot or link wallet. Can’t post more than 1 embedded media as new user.)

So I guess his new plan is this: every cycle, take half of the vlCVX rewards and send to personal wallet (0xf6c40C4391D6570032D2EB7A9CD9935898c430CF) to buy and stake USDM to earn a bigger share of the rewards in the name of “recovering peg” (in reality he’s just taking half the rewards and then staking them to earn even more rewards for himself) the other half accrues to PBM stakers as usual, but now he’s stealing a bigger share of this now as well (1.3m USDM and counting) that means his scam fee is now 50% + 1.3m/24m (TVL of PBM) = 55% again.

So what do the teams of Curve, Convex, StakeDAO, and Yearn recommend that we do? The health of our industry depends on our ability to police bad actors. This request for proposals from the four teams is being cross posted to each governance forum. If there is a meta-forum, we’d be pleased to move our request there. We’re hoping for optimal solutions that help our Curve Federation.